04-02-2008

Transcript of Presentation by SLDF Spokesperson Ahilan Kadirgamar at the
Law and Society Trust Forum in Colombo on 29 January 2008.

Lost Opportunities, APRC and the Political Process

The title of my talk is ‘Lost Opportunities, APRC and the Political Process’. Many of you know who I might be referring to when I start with the words ‘Lost Opportunities’; it is someone very close to us, Kethesh Loganathan, who authored a book titled ‘Lost Opportunities’ almost twelve years ago. This is the first time I am speaking at a public forum in Colombo following the assassination of Kethesh, who has had a tremendous influence on me and whom I consider to be one of my mentors. So, I start my talk by reading at length from Kethesh’s ‘Lost Opportunities’, a book written perhaps at a similar political moment twelve years ago. I will
first read from the introduction and then from the conclusion:

“Our objective, however, is quite simple and limited in scope. What we propose to do in this publication is to highlight the political context in which attempts were made to address and resolve the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka – and how they failed. In short, as the title of this volume
suggests it is a political commentary on ‘lost opportunities’ of resolving the ethnic conflict. …

Yet, another limitation of this study is that in identifying the various components of the Ethnic Conflict, the specific elements constituting the situation of the Up-country Tamils, as well as emerging Islamic identity, have not been given the same prominence as the secessionist demand for ‘Tamil Eelam’, on the one hand, and the zealous protection of the “unitary” and ‘Sinhala – Buddhist’ State of Sri Lanka, on the other. The reasons are:

The Up-country Tamils of recent - Indian origin or the “Plantation Tamils” and the polity that represents them, either on an ethnic or class basis, were not mobilised around the demand for ‘Tamil Eelam’, or for that matter the demand for federalism and regional autonomy. The struggle of the Up-country Tamils, were primarily centred around the restoration of fundamental democratic and civic rights (i.e. the eradication of ‘statelessness’) and their rights as the single largest segment of Sri Lanka’s working class – the plantation proletariat.

As far as the Muslims are concerned, the majority are indeed, Tamil speaking. However, only one-third of the Muslim populace live in the Northern and Eastern provinces claimed by Tamil nationalists to be their “traditional homeland”. Further the ascendance of Islamic identity,
although a relatively recent phenomenon, is now a reality. The conscious attempts by the Sri Lankan State to drive a wedge between the Tamils and the Muslims, particularly in the Eastern province and which took an ugly turn during the militarization of the ethnic conflict during the 80s and the more recent ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the Muslims from the Northern province by the LTTE have exacerbated this divide. This is not to suggest that this divide is irreversible. However, to lump all Muslims into a category of “Tamil – speaking people” and, therefore project them as an integral and inseparable component of the Tamil national movement, is not
valid – or realistic. It is only convenient to Tamil Nationalism and a threat to Sinhala nationalism. To the Muslims, it remains a question that they have the right to decide.”

And from the concluding section:

“The distinction between the ‘liberation struggle’ and ‘terrorism’ has become blurred. The armed struggle was never mass –based; it reduced the People to the status of “observers” or contributors to the coffers of the ‘sole protectors’. Those among the people who were inclined towards national reconciliation and accommodation were branded ‘traitors’. In addition, the ‘battle’ was no longer against the State and its organs. Non–combatant civilians, particularly in the ‘border areas’, became legitimate targets. ‘Terrorism’ also came to be used to shape events – either (hopefully) to provoke a backlash and thereby further legitimize the role of ‘ sole protectors’, or to take the war to where it hurt most and, in the process, demonstrate invincibility - and of course, to weaken and erode the peace constituency.

Similarly “the war for peace” slogan of the present PA Government is beginning to turn sour. Although more and more real estate is being brought under the control of the Sri Lankan security forces, the LTTE’s military infrastructure and command structure appears to remain intact. The ‘hearts and minds’ campaign is being eroded of increasing instances of atrocities and human rights violations in areas recently ‘liberated’ by the security forces. To further compound the situation, the Devolution Proposals at the time of this writing are in the process of being diluted to accommodate competing interests as well as apprehensions – but, inevitable perhaps, catering more to majority fears and perceptions.”

It is almost hard to believe that Kethesh wrote these words twelve years ago. Kethesh is prophetic in his analysis and he is all the more missed now, as we struggle to make sense of our current political moment, amidst another lost opportunity to find a political solution.

I want to very quickly talk about the context of the APRC (All Party Representative Committee) process, including some background. The APRC and the Panel of Experts were launched in July 2006 when the President convened the two bodies to find a political solution. The context for the launch of the APRC was the failure of the Norwegian peace process. The
Norwegian peace process which we in SLDF have characterized as a two-party process, between the LTTE and the government, if it had not indeed collapsed earlier, certainly very little of it was left in July 2006 with an undeclared war and its attendant violence. And now with the abrogation of the CFA, it is indeed a declared war. From April 2003 until 2006, there were abuses by both parties to the CFA, but after the LTTE withdrew from talks in April 2003, it will not be an exaggeration to say that the LTTE held the peace process hostage, by escalating the violence and refusing to take any serious steps towards a negotiated political solution. The LTTE refused to engage on, what at that time was called the “core issues” relating to a permanent political solution, as the LTTE was only interested in an interim administration. In 2006, we saw some major changes in the South, what Kethesh called ten years earlier, the erosion of the “peace constituency”, while a resurgent Sinhala Buddhist nationalist constituency strengthened and gained ground. It is in that context, that in 2006, an inclusive process, including the minority communities such as the Muslim community and the Up-Country Tamil
community, both of which were not recognized by the Norwegian peace process, and the various Southern parties, including the vocal Sinhala nationalist parties were brought into this inclusive APRC process. The APRC at that time was also called a mechanism to attempt a Southern Consensus, which would then be used to negotiate with the LTTE, and that
was at least one of the token reasons given for not inviting the TNA (the proxy of the LTTE) into the APRC process.

Many of us at that time including SLDF welcomed the APRC process, because we believed in the importance of an ongoing political process. And indeed, we will need a political process even after the scuttling of the APRC process. In terms of ways forward, we have to discuss the kind of political process that needs to be pursued and the alternatives available to us. .

And that political process, the APRC, did not have a bad start, particularly with the launch of the Majority Report of the Experts Committee. Many of us welcomed it and saw it as a glimmer of hope. Imust say, that it was disappointing that there was little support from civil society for the Majority Report when it came out. It is not that we agreed with the report wholesale, but it was an opportunity to start a national debate on the National Question, but that was not to be.

This was followed in January 2007, by what is commonly called the Tissa Vitarana Report, which integrated many of the concerns of the Majority Report, with one major difference. Prof. Vitarana in launching his own proposals calling on the fourteen political parties in the APRC process to respond to his report, took the question of the merger of the North and
East out of the deliberation of the APRC and claimed it should be addressed through inclusive peace talks at a later stage, as it would be virtually impossible to arrive at a consensus with such a contentious issue as the merger.

The third source of optimism was the MOU between the SLFP and the UNP, that they would leave aside partisan politics in arriving at a political solution over a period of two years. Such an understanding between the two major parties had been a long-standing need to arrive at a political solution; unless the two major political parties were willing to work together, constitutional reform which requires a two thirds majority in parliament would be difficult. The MOU also did not last long as partisan politics yet again led to its demise.

Such positive steps were undermined by a number of factors over the last
year.

First, we as part of civil society need to do some soul searching, we cannot just be preaching to the political actors, and we had not mobilised a strong enough national movement that could take the debate in an independent direction as a challenge to the political parties. This was
reflected in the lack of an engaging response to the Majority Report and the Tissa Vitarana Report.

Second, was the collapse of the MOU between the SLFP and the UNP, which was a major setback to the possibility of implementing any future proposals. That was followed by the UNP walking out of the process in February 2007. The UNP walking out of the APRC also meant the strengthening of the Sinhala nationalist parties and the Sinhala nationalist sections of the SLFP in their interaction with the APRC. The JVP had walked out soon after the launch of the Majority Report in December 2006, but the JVP continued to undermine the APRC from outside by putting pressure on the government.

The alarm bells went off in May 2007, when the SLFP proposals, which were completely out of the ambit of the debate, were made public. The SLFP called for devolution to the district, going back forty or fifty years in the debate around devolution. It called for a unitary structure of the state, which was not the compromise that moderates were looking at. When it came to the structure of the state, the compromise that we were looking at was the dropping of both the labels, federal and unitary. The compromise was considered to be a constitution with certain federal features, but with neither label and within a united Sri Lanka.

Nevertheless, due to the leadership of Prof. Vitarana, the APRC deliberations continued and there was hope that the proposals would be launched in mid-August. The UNP had given August 15th as the deadline for the launch of the proposals if they were to return to negotiations on a set of proposals. However, a week before their launch the JHU intervened and claimed that unless the proposals insisted on a unitary structure of the state, they would oppose the proposals. The JVP in turn threatened to bring down the government at the budget vote if a non-unitary proposal was brought out of the APRC. This led to the further stalling of the APRC and a few weeks later in early September the President gave a candid interview to IANS in which he said, that he was voted in by Sinhala voters and that in any election he will have to carry the Sinhala constituency and therefore any attempt at a political solution will have to begin with a unitary structure of the state as a starting point. For a President of a country to say that he is a hostage of only one community in the country is completely unacceptable and reflects the lack of leadership within this government.

The budget vote took place in December and the President gave the end of January as a deadline for launching proposals. And here I must say that one constituency that has been vocal and engaged with the need for proposals towards a political solution is the international community. While they are not a constituency that can perhaps comment on the substance of the proposals, they have been pushing the process to reach a conclusion.

The month of January as all of you know has been quite eventful. Initially, we were expecting a final set of proposals. But two weeks before the deadline of January 23rd, the President called a meeting of the APRC and handed them a document on the basis of which he wanted a set of
proposals on interim arrangements. The talk during the next ten days was that there were going to be two sets of proposals, one on interim arrangements and the other for substantive reform of the state. But what we saw last week was merely the interim proposals calling for interim
arrangements including implementation of certain features of the 13th amendment.

It was a big disappointment to say the least, if not one of the major political shams in the last decade in this country. The 13th amendment is twenty years old, it could have been implemented twenty years ago or for that matter ten years ago or even a year ago, but the President chose the current moment to implement certain features of the 13th amendment.
However, this is about much more than the 13th Amendment.

These interim proposals are first to be seen as an attempt to deflect the proposals that have been deliberated for 18 months and call for a substantial set of proposals to address the National Question.

Next, if you look at the substance of the proposals there are two major issues. One, a deliberative body, the APRC, claims the environment in the East is conducive for election. I am not sure, where the APRC gets its mandate to make such a claim about the elections, particularly when elections could lead to much violence and even a blood bath, and the emergence of repressive militarized structures. Two, it calls for an Interim Council in the North, which would also serve the same purpose.

So, the substance of the interim proposals are also of serious concern and one may have to conclude that these interim arrangements are only appendages of the government’s war effort as militarized repressive structures that can support the escalation of the war.

Finally, the deflection of the APRC and its attempt to bring about a final set of proposals, which may now never see the light of day, is a huge blow to the confidence of the minority communities in particular. That is the manner in which the APRC and the minority parties have been intimidated and pressured by the wishes of the Executive.

Now, I am going to step back and take a look at lessons learned. Kethesh’s message twelve years ago as he looked at lessons learned from the Banda-Chelva pact to the 1995 proposals, are still resonant, and I think whether it is the Norwegian peace process or the APRC, there is
always the need for civil society to reflect and learn from the past.

One point we have been clear on, is that if there is to be devolution of power and constitutional reform, there is a need for a southern consensus, particularly between the two major political parties. There was a moment here, with the MOU between the SLFP and the UNP, but why wasn’t that sustainable? That is one question we need to ask.

Secondly, civil society, and I mean civil society in the broader sense of the term, from Colombo to the periphery and the whole range of institutions, have to hold political actors accountable. We all know about the level of political opportunism in the country and without a clear political vision from a vocal civil society it will be hard to hold political actors accountable.

Thirdly, there is a need for a national debate on the National Question. As far as SLDF is concerned, we have been campaigning from outside, to try and create a broad debate in the public sphere around the issue of a political solution. We have to find the openings for such a national debate, as without such a national debate, civil society will not be able to coalesce a political vision and hold political actors accountable.

I am going to make some suggestions about the way forward and I hope we can have a lively discussion, as these are only suggestions for a discussion.

The APRC has taken a major blow to its confidence, but even at this very late stage, we have to think in terms of what we can salvage from the deliberations of the APRC. Is it for example possible to salvage a final report signed by the minority parties and the Left parties? Such a report could become a benchmark for any future political process, and it will be a step towards preparing for any future political opening.

SLDF has always made the point that the political process should continue, even at the level of dissent. A complete shut down of the political process would mean that there will only be a military process, and that is the agenda of the military actors, whether it is in the South or North.
So, we have to figure out ways to keep the political process alive and broaden the space for the political process. And we have to have imagination in creating alternative ways of sustaining the political process.

The APRC process for the most part functioned under the patronage of this government, and given the loss of confidence in the government, and the possible failure of the APRC, then the political process may have to function outside of the patronage of this government. Can civil society take the lead in terms of the political process? Can the minority parties take the lead in the political process which is to address the grievances and aspirations of their constituencies? How could a national debate around a political solution be stimulated?

Once again I want to emphasize the importance of the political process, because in the absence of movement and discussion around a political solution, it becomes an issue of a military solution and purely a question of “security”; the context in which a repressive State finds it normal to
detain thousands of people in Colombo and to evict busloads of people to the North.

Part of the function of a political process and a national debate on the National Question is an ideological challenge to the resurgence of the Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, which is dominating the public sphere in the country. Therefore, in these troubling times and as we face a bleak year
ahead, even at the level of dissent, we cannot give up on the debate around a political solution.

Thank You.

Source-SLDF