An Independent and Interactive Tamil Community Web Site

08-04-2006

LTTE's Diaspora Resources
For the LTTE, it is profitable to keep the pot boiling without letting it flow over. A range of front organizations, both in Sri Lanka and among the Lankan Tamil Diaspora, play a crucial role in keeping its fundraising lifeline intact.

SAJI CHERIAN

The 'peace' in Sri Lanka has held out for four years - though a string of killings, including some high profile political assassinations, continued recruitment and training of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cadres, the abduction and forcible recruitment of children by the rebel group, a continuous arms buildup, and a wide range of activities manifestly inconsistent with the idea of peace have persisted without interruption throughout this 'peace'. The sheer relief of having avoided open and large-scale warfare, however, has encouraged both the Sri Lankan government and the 'international community' to look the other way, or merely register formal protests, even while the LTTE continues to consolidate its military and political power in its areas of domination.

Procuring adequate finances lies at the heart of this process of consolidation, and fundraising remains the LTTE's lifeline. A range of front organizations, both in Sri Lanka and among the Lankan Tamil Diaspora, play a crucial role in keeping this lifeline intact.

The Tamil Diaspora has long been a source of easy and regular finance for the LTTE. In the early years of the insurgency and particularly following the 1983 anti-Tamil riots, the exodus of a number of Tamils from the northern parts of the country and capital Colombo was viewed as a setback for the LTTE's recruitment for their the Eelam war. Over time, however, this created significant advantages as the Diaspora was increasing organized and tapped to meet the rebels' financial needs. Estimates vary, but the number of Sri Lankan Tamils has been put in the region of approximately 200,000-250,000 in Canada; 110,000 in the United Kingdom; 50,000 in Germany, and about 30,000 each in Switzerland, France, and Australia; no authoritative figures are available for the US, but estimates vary between a modest 50,000 to 300,000. In recent years, this ready source has come under some pressure in the United States and United Kingdom, due to the ban imposed on the outfit - though front organizations are quick to reinvent their identities and resume operations - but in Canada and in the European Union nations, the Tamil Diaspora groups continue to act without any significant legal constraints to secure funds for the LTTE. .

A well-established and efficient mechanism for the collection and handling of LTTE finances has been set up across international borders. All Diaspora activities operate under its 'International Secretariat", which operates from Kilinochchi in Sri Lanka and has designated 'country representatives' who exercise coercive influence over all Tamil expatriate activity in each country through their respective Tamil Coordinating Committees (TCC). To facilitate the transfer of Diaspora contributions, a number of country-specific organisations have been formed, but a pivotal role has been played by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) that was established in 1985, with an extensive network of branches operating in at least 13 countries. Sources indicate that the TRO also maintains a number of bank accounts in these countries including the Barclays Bank in Paris, the Spatkasse Monchengladbach bank in Germany, the BG Bank in Denmark and the TD Canada Trust Bank in Canada.

Following the Tsunami of December 26, 2004, the TRO was able to collect a huge amount in donations by Tamil expatriates. According to sources, between January 1st and August 15th 2005 alone, the TRO had received a sum of US$ 9,383,923 as donations.

Apart its comprehensive fundraising mechanisms, the Diaspora also acts a powerful pressure group that has substantially created the margins within which the LTTE is able to continue with its activities. It is significant that, in 2000, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had identified eight nonprofit organizations in Canada as fronts of the LTTE. And noted, "Most funds raised under the banner of humanitarian organizations such as the TRO are channeled instead to fund the LTTE war effort." The CSIS recommended that the LTTE be added to the list of banned organizations under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and this recommendation had been put up to the Cabinet on several occasions. However, the large number of Tamils present in the country, and the political and electoral influence they wield in certain constituencies, has precluded effective action against the LTTE, and the Cabinet has rejected the CSIS recommendations each time.

In January 2005, the Canadian ex- Justice Minister Irwin Cotler conceded quite frankly, "Toronto I think has the largest number of Tamils... outside of Sri Lanka, so we've got to be very careful just in terms of our own relationships." Such 'concern' has been advantageous for the Liberal Party, securing overwhelming support from the Tamil constituency during elections. It is useful to note that, while the February 2006 Parliamentary Elections paved the way for the Conservative Party to gain victory over the Liberal Party after a gap of nearly 12 years, the Conservatives failed to win a single seat in the three major cities of Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal, which host a significant Tamil Diaspora.

In the run-up to the elections, the Conservatives had declared their intentions to ban the LTTE. On January 19, 2006, the Conservative Party's Deputy Leader and Public Safety Critic, Peter MacKay, had stated, "I think we have to be definitive in saying that we certainly support the Tamil community, but there is a very clear and distinct line that has to be drawn when it comes to terrorist fundraising that we feel is happening in Canada right now, based on CSIS reports".

Intelligence reports estimate that, during the pre-ceasefire period, the LTTE were getting $10 million a year from Canada alone. Following the declaration of cease-fire in 2002, reports indicated a dip in collections, but recent Canadian media reports suggested a resurgence of fundraising and extortion efforts. In November 2005, members of Toronto's Tamil community disclosed that they were being asked for money by door-to-door LTTE fundraisers for 'Eelam War IV'. Community members said they were told to make an immediate cash-contribution of $2,500, and that those who didn't contribute would not be allowed to travel in Tamil-controlled parts of Sri Lanka when they returned for visits.

This threat is real, since the LTTE maintains a record of Tamil expatriates, ascertained through elaborate forms that have to be filled out by expatriate. On duly filling the forms, the expatriate is provided with a 'Tamil Eelam Identity Card Number' that is used for future reference as well as during visits to the LTTE-controlled territories of Sri Lanka.

Within Sri Lanka itself, the LTTE has adopted a system called 'Nandavanan' to collect information regarding any person of Tamil origin who resides overseas. Each member of the Tamil Diaspora is monitored from the moment they enter LTTE controlled areas. Such individuals are spotted by LTTE border guards and asked for proof that monthly or yearly 'taxes' have been paid by the former in their host country.

These 'taxes' or 'pledges' tend to be on the higher side (some reports peg them at $25,000 to $100,000 annually), if the person has a business establishment. If the LTTE cadre implementing 'Nandavanan' is of the view that persons had not contributed sufficiently to the cause, they are instructed to pay up immediately or write an undertaking to do so on return. Following this, all information is communicated by the 'Nandavanan' cadre to the Tamil Coordinating Committee of the country concerned, with the order to obtain the balance sum 'due' to the LTTE from the individual on return.

Even in countries where it is proscribed, such as Australia and the United States, the LTTE continues to effectively raise funds through sympathetic social and cultural organisations. The US State Department has identified the World Tamil Association, World Tamil Movement, the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils, the Ellilan Force, and the Sangilian Force as front organizations of the LTTE, but the TRO is not on this list. In Australia, on the other hand, in January 2005, the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated in the Federal Parliament that the government had identified the TRO as an entity associated with the LTTE and that the government has not funded TRO's development program because of this association. Nevertheless, proof of continuing LTTE activities in Australia was provided on November 23, 2005, when Australian Federal Police (AFP) raided premises of LTTE operatives in Melbourne and arrested more than 15 persons for questioning, including Thillai Jeyakumar, head of the LTTE operations in Australia and its 'Economic Advisor' Jeyarajan Maheswaran. The AFP also seized computer hardware, passports, cash, diaries, bank receipts, and cheque books from the operatives. Further, The Australian had reported that the TRO had collected close to $1.1 million in donations from Australia following the Tsunami.

The European Union, on the other hand, continues to use the 'threat of ban' instead of actually banning the LTTE. On September 27, 2005, threatening to list the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, the European Union said its member states will no longer receive the rebel delegations because of continued violence by Tigers in Sri Lanka. However, such threats are far from sufficient to deter the LTTE from continuing to consolidate its position, both financially and politically. For instance, on March 15, 2006, a Sri Lankan Tamil Social Democrat member of the Herning City Council in Denmark, Arul Thilainadarasa, was expelled from his party following the disclosure of his links with the LTTE. The Tamil politician was exposed as a former Chairman of the Tamil Coordination Committee in Denmark, which reportedly ran 28 'Mother Tongue' schools throughout the country and received funds from the city councils.

The LTTE continues to exploit the lack of uniformity between countries in terms of significant action against its mechanisms for fundraising and extortion. The prevalent period of 'no war' has also allowed the LTTE to secure greater bargaining power among western audiences, while the fear of an imminent threat of return to war has, at the same time, helped it to corner more donations from the Tamil expatriate population who, in turn, would not like to abandon the eelam in times of war. For the LTTE, it is, consequently, profitable to keep the pot boiling without letting it flow over.

Source-Out-Look India.com